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Abstract
In this paper, we provide evidence that civilian and military gov-
ernment spending have specific characteristics that can affect differ-
ently private consumption. Our Vector Autoregressive (VAR) esti-
mates for the US economy for the period 1960−2013 show that civil-
ian expenditure induces a positive and significant response on private
consumption, whereas military spending has a negative impact. We
also analyze the effects of these public spending components for the
subsamples 1960−1979 and 1983−2013, respectively. Our results show
that the main transmission channels of both civilian and military ex-
penditures have changed over time.
We adopt a new Keynesian approach and develop a Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in order to simulate the em-
pirical evidence. Both the larger persistence of shocks in military
spending and the different financing mechanisms, which account for
the propensity of policy-makers to use budget deficits to finance wars,
mimic the differences in the empirical responses of private consump-
tion. Simulated impulse response functions of alternative specification
models prove the robustness of our analysis. In particular, we assess
the impact of civilian and military shocks in the presence of different:
i) shares of heterogeneous households; ii) price rigidities; iii) monetary
reactions in response to diverse government shocks.
Keywords: Military and civilian spending, Structural Vector Au-
toregressive (SVAR) model, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model.
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Introduction
Recently, US public opinion has showed renewed interest in the economic
impact of fiscal policy. At the end of 2013, an intense debate and media
coverage concerned the US federal government shutdown. The tensions that
ultimately produced this shutdown arose due to the different perspectives
of policy-makers concerning the deficit reduction through a simultaneous
increase in tax rates and decrease in government spending.1 The main moti-
vation of this debate is that the economic literature did not provide conclu-
sive results regarding how public expenditure and its financing mechanism
can affect the economic performance of private sector. In general, contrast-
ing results mainly depend on the theoretical perspective and the empirical
methodology used (Cogan et al., 2010).
The neoclassical approach suggests a strategic explanation to account for
the economic effects of large cyclical rises in government spending. Based on
major unexpected political events, it assumes that the periods of increased
military spending correspond to the dates of war or threats of war. Ramey
& Shapiro (1999), later extended by Ramey (2011), proposed a so-called
“narrative” approach, which selected the start of the three wars in which
the US actively intervened (i.e., Korean, Vietnam and the Soviet invasion
1In this regard, Feldstein (2008) argued that any Department of Defense (DoD) budget
cuts may be misguided. He also suggested that in the recent downturn cycle, the US
government should have recognized the need to increase government spending to offset the
decline in consumer demand in the economy, and stated that a rise in military spending
would be the best way to provide this stimulus.
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of Afghanistan) and the 2001 terrorist attack, to identify empirically large
exogenous increases in US defense spending. The significant criticism of
this approach (modeled by the “Expectations Augmented Vector Autore-
gressive”, EVAR, specifications) is that other substantial fiscal shocks may
have occurred at the same time. In turn, these other shocks may interfere
with the identification of military shocks, implying distorted results.2
The economic literature has proposed an alternative approach to test the
effects of fiscal policy on economy. In particular, a large set of studies has
focused on Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) models with differences
in the identification issues of fiscal shocks.3 Although Bouakez, Chihi &
Normandin (2014) have recently criticized this approach, Perotti (2014) has
clearly shown that SVAR models properly identified achieve the same results
of the EVAR by Ramey (2011).
In this paper, we review the economic consequences of changes in the
US fiscal policy following a baseline SVAR model extended for the fiscal
components of military and civilian spending. The main question of inter-
est is whether unexpected military and non-military expenditures produce
2As an example of this debate, Perotti (2005) at page 5 argues that ‘Ramey and Shapiro
date the start of the Korean war shock in 1950:Q3, based on the large observed increase
in military spending; but in four quarters between 1948:Q2 and 1950:Q3, government
spending increased by between two and three standard deviations. It is not obvious how
to disentangle the effects of the Korean dummy variable from the delayed effects of these
large fiscal shocks’.
3A very large body of empirical literature includes structural restrictions of impulse
response functions (Enders, Muller & Scholl, 2011), relations among variables and error
terms in the structural form (Corsetti, Meier & Muller, 2012), or external institutional
information, which tends to exploit the quarterly nature of data and fiscal policy decision
lags (Perotti, 2005).
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“contractionary” or “expansionary” effects on private consumption, respec-
tively. We contribute to the existing literature by showing that differences
on private consumption effects are based on how the shocks of government
spending components are driven by their persistence and types of financing
mechanisms.
We base our hypotheses on the findings of Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles
(2007) who show that a positive government spending shock leads to a signif-
icant increase in private consumption when defense expenditure is excluded.
Accordingly, they infer the hypothesis that military spending has a negligi-
ble or negative impact on consumption. However, previous literature found
conflicting empirical results about the effects of different public spending
components on consumption and other macroeconomic variables. Using a
partial equilibrium model Pieroni (2009) has shown that private consumption
responds negatively to military expenditure increases. In terms of private in-
vestment, the findings by Smith (1980) show the so-called “crowding-out”
effect. On the contrary, Aschauer (1989) provided evidence that positive
government spending shocks induce an increase in private investment. More
recently, F-deCordoba & Torres (2016), using a DSGE model with a security
factor in the utility function, have found that the increase in the external
threat induces a rise in military spending, investment and output while it re-
duces consumption. Finally, Malizard (2015) provided evidence of a positive
effect on private investment due to military equipment spending (considered
as public investment) for the case of France.
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As in Blanchard & Perotti (2002), who estimated output fiscal effects,
we report a comparison of the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) effects of mili-
tary and civilian spending shocks on consumption for the US: although we
estimate a negative effect of military expenditure on consumption, our re-
sults show that civilian government purchases have a largely positive effect
on private consumption. In order to check the robustness of our empirical
analysis, we compare the different impacts of civilian and military spend-
ing for two subsamples that correspond to the periods before and after the
“Great Moderation”.4 Our results indicate that the transmission channels of
both civilian and military shocks have changed over time. Regarding civilian
spending, we find that the responses of macroeconomic aggregates are less
significant in the post-1980 sample. On the contrary, the effects of military
shocks are mostly significant in the second subsample.
In this paper, following the most recent literature (see, among others, Ja-
cob, 2015), we develop a new Keynesian model to mimic the empirical results.
This framework offers the advantage of taking into account forward-looking
expectations of households and firms, and encompasses many ingredients of
modern dynamic optimizing sticky-price models, although it is modified by
allowing for the presence of consumers subject to credit constraints. In par-
ticular, we consider an economy populated by a continuum of infinitely lived
4With the term “Great Moderation” we refer to the period in which the US economy
experienced a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations. In particular,
starting in the 1980s major US economic variables such as real gross domestic product
and inflation began to decline in volatility.
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households that are divided into Ricardians and non-Ricardians. Ricardians
can trade securities and accumulate physical capital, whereas non-Ricardians
do not have access to capital markets and simply consume their current la-
bor income.5 The advantage of such approach is straightforward. Despite
the negative wealth effect associated with an increase in the tax burden, the
response of aggregate consumption to a spending shock can be positive un-
der the presence of non-Ricardian consumers (Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles,
2007).
In our theoretical model, we extend the original framework of Bilbiie,
Meier & Muller (2008) by disentangling civilian and military spending shocks.
We motivate our framework according to the two main findings of our empir-
ical estimates. First, we observed a stronger persistence of military spending
shock than civilian spending shock. In particular, the high persistence of
the military spending shock increases the negative wealth effect on Ricar-
dian households and further lowers their consumption spending. As a con-
sequence, we observe the fall in aggregate consumption in response to this
shock. Second, our empirical estimates show the effects of a different financ-
ing mechanism of civilian and military expenditures. The former is mainly
financed by the increase in taxation rate, while the latter is mainly funded
by government budget deficit. In this regard, the heterogeneity of consumers
also implies different transmission channels through which fiscal policy af-
5See Campbell & Mankiw (1989) for the original description of the economic behavior of
non-Ricardian consumers, and Baker (2015) for the importance of debt held by households
in the presence of income fluctuations.
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fects the economy. In our analysis, this issue is particularly important in
order to examine the different effects of military and civilian spending. In
contrast to Favero & Giavazzi (2007), who explicitly include the long run
government budget constraint, the new Keynesian model presented below
comprises, along with a taxation rule, a deficit financing rule.
Our simulated results of the baseline new Keynesian model show that
private consumption responds positively to civilian spending whereas mili-
tary expenditure negatively affects private consumption. Some robustness
tests are presented in order to compare the dynamic responses of private
consumption to a different persistence and financing mechanisms of civil-
ian and military spending shocks. We also analyze the impact of these two
components of government spending on private consumption in the cases of
different shares of Ricardian households and degrees of price rigidities. Fi-
nally, we assess the effects of different fiscal shocks when monetary policy
changes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we discuss the
basic literature and some stylized facts of how the US finances government
spending, in particular within the identified war dates. Secondly, we present
our empirical specifications showing the data and discussing the empirical
results. Thirdly, we present our theoretical framework and the model cali-
bration. Fourthly, we examine the simulated impulse responses of consump-
tion to the different government spending shocks and the robustness analysis.
Finally, we offer a concluding discussion.
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Private consumption and the financing mech-
anism of military expenditure
Barro (1979, 1981) conducted several studies highlighting the economic ef-
fects of government spending and the alternative methods and impacts of
financing this expenditure. In particular, Barro (1981) stressed the fact that
government expenditures can provide direct welfare to economic agents and
that variations in the level of government expenditure may have an impact on
the consumption decisions of households. Based on this work, one strand of
the literature shows that different financing sources of public sector compo-
nents lead to heterogeneous effects on private consumption when consumers
are constrained in their asset purchases.
In this section, we focus on the different mechanisms used to finance
military spending in the US. We focus on the shocks near wartime, including
threats of war. Our analysis follows the US war episodes described by Ramey
(2011) except for the Korean War, which is outside our sample. In particular,
we focus on the patterns of government budget deficit and tax revenues.
In this regard, in the left column of Figure 1, dashed black lines indicate
the “actual” patterns of US government deficit in each war episode. As a
comparison, solid black lines denote the “counterfactual” levels of government
budget deficit, assuming no change relative to the first quarter of each war
episode. Similarly, the right column of Figure 1 shows the same comparison
in the case tax revenues. We observe that government deficit substantially
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increases in all these episodes. On the contrary, tax revenues fall over the
same periods. The only exception is the Carter-Reagan military buildup.
However, we note that this increase is much lower (about 1%) than the rise
in government deficit (about 6%) implying that almost the whole burden of
military outlay has been financed through borrowing from the public.
We emphasize our paper’s contribution arguing that the effect of military
spending on private consumption also depends on the financing mechanism.
In particular, unplanned episodes such as wars are generally financed by bud-
get deficits. Thus, from a Keynesian perspective, since greater military outlay
is not offset by the contraction induced by higher taxes, wars typically cause
a short-term economic boom boosting aggregate demand and consumption.
As argued by Nincic & Cusack (1979) and Krell (1981), this is one of the main
economic explanations of increases in military spending. However, Barker,
Dunne & Smith (1991) have shown that such increases have contractionary
effects on the UK economy. In particular, these authors assumed that the
defense reductions are matched by balanced increases in other public expen-
ditures. As a consequence, they found that consumption expenditures and
GDP increase in response to cuts in military spending. Given these conflict-
ing findings, our main objective is to provide a more formal assessment of
the effects of different public spending components on private consumption
accounting for the several transmission channels through which these shocks
affect the US economy.
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Figure 1 in here
Empirical evidence
In this section, we empirically analyze several transmission mechanisms through
which public spending components affect private consumption. In particular,
we estimate the impulse response functions based on the shocks to civilian
and military expenditures.
Specification and identification
As a baseline specification of our model, we adopt a SVAR. Its reduced form
is defined by the following dynamic equation:
Yt = c+ A (L)Yt−1 + Ut (1)
where Yt indicates the vector of variables specified below, A(L) is an auto-
regressive lag polynomial, c a constant term, and Ut the vector of reduced-
form innovations. Our analysis is focused on the US economy and our sample
period is 1960:Q1−2013:Q4, which is chosen for reasons of data availability.
In particular, we use the OECD Economic Outlook No. 90 Database as pri-
mary source for most of our variables.6 The quarterly series for military and
6Although there are more recent versions of the OECD Economic Outlook Database,
some of these updated series are not consistent with the data in the earlier years of our
sample.
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civilian spending are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As a lim-
itation of our analysis, the absence of longtime series at quarterly frequency
for government spending components in other countries different from the
US does not allow us an international comparison.
Our empirical strategy based on quarterly data is in line with the new
Keynesian perspective, which sustains that a discretionary fiscal policy plau-
sibly does not respond within a quarter to a change in the economy.7 From
an empirical point of view, a substantial issue is associated with the perspec-
tive that private agents receive signals about future changes in government
spending before these changes take place. This, in turn, should affect the
validity of the SVAR representation. In particular, the anticipation effect of
the expenditure in the military sector argued by Ramey (2011) may lead to
differences in the shock effects of this component on the economy. There-
fore, following previous economic literature on this topic, we include dummy
variables in the “military” VAR system controlling for anticipation effects.8
More specifically, these dummies correspond to the dates accounting for the
major military events, as described in Ramey & Shapiro (1999). These dates
are: 1965:Q1, 1980:Q1, 2001:Q3.9
We estimate the impulse responses of military and civilian spending shocks
separately with a five-variable VAR because they are not significantly linked,
7We follow the approach used by Auerbach (2000).
8See, for example, Leeper, Walker & Yang (2013).
9With respect to Ramey (2011), the Korean date (1950:Q1) is excluded because it is
outside of our sample.
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identifying different transmission effects on economy. Following the strategy
outlined in Equation (1), first we specify the model analyzing the effects of
the civilian component:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt, NMt] (2)
where Ct denotes the log of real private consumption, Wt the log of real
wage, DINCt the log of real disposable income, BDt the government budget
deficit and NMt the civilian spending. More specifically, civilian spending
is obtained as the difference between government consumption expenditure
and national defense data.10 Both civilian spending and budget deficit enter
the VAR as a ratio of current GDP. Our choice is motivated both by the
easier interpretation in terms of measurement of consumption responses that
are expressed as unit changes and in order to be consistent with our DSGE
model (see, for example, Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles, 2007; Bilbiie, Meier &
Muller, 2008). All the remaining real variables are expressed in per capita
terms.11
As an identification strategy for fiscal policy shocks, we adopt a Cholesky
factorization in order to recover the vector of structural shocks t (and its
variance Ω) from the reduced-form error Ut in Equation (1). It is worth-
10Since we are interested in the short-run effects of government spending shocks on
private consumption, we omit public investment from the data. As a robustness check, we
considered both public consumption and public investment and we obtained results that
are very close to those presented below.
11The Online appendix provides a detailed description of data sources and construction.
13
while noticing that the structural identification of Blanchard & Perotti (2002)
of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski decomposition, in
which government spending is ordered before the other variables.12 In partic-
ular, we assume the following set of conditions. We consider civilian spending
as the most exogenous variable. The interaction between civilian expendi-
ture and taxation rate influences the budget deficit: if the civilian spending
increase is financed by tax rises, the budget deficit may be negative. Con-
versely, if a civilian expenditure rise is not followed by a corresponding in-
crease in taxation rate, the budget deficit is positive. We implicitly allow for
heterogeneous consumers (namely, Ricardians and non-Ricardians). Because
household demand for goods depends on the expected value of taxes (i.e.,
disposable income), each household subtracts its share of this present value
(real wage) from the expected present value of income in order to determine a
net wealth position. Lastly, we consider private consumption as the most en-
dogenous variable, which is therefore affected by all contemporaneous values
of all the variables in the VAR.
Since our main focus is on the comparison of the private consumption
effects of civilian and military shocks, we repeat the same experiment sub-
stituting civilian expenditure (NMt) with military spending (Mt) in the
VAR model. In this case, the vector of variables Yt in Equation (1) may be
12As in Blanchard & Perotti (2002), the condition for identification is that the compo-
nent of government spending does not respond to government or private macroeconomic
variables, contemporaneously.
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expressed as:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt,Mt] (3)
Similar to the civilian spending case, military spending enters the VAR as
a ratio of current GDP. Again, we adopt a Cholesky factorization in which
private consumption, real wages, disposable income and budget deficits are
allowed to depend on the fiscal variable (in this case, military expenditure)
and are ordered, respectively.
Finally, we focus on one issue that has been highly disputed in the recent
literature on the effects of fiscal components on the economy. In particular,
many authors (see, for example, Leeper, Plante & Traum, 2010) have argued
that the specific characteristic of the government expenditure in VAR models
is its persistence driven by the presence of trends. In this regard, military
spending has a clear downward trend, while civilian spending is more station-
ary.13 In general, the presence of trends in fiscal series (as shares of GDP)
is not limited to non-defense spending, but is pervasive. For instance, in the
dataset used by Leeper, Plante & Traum (2010) to estimate a DSGE model
using Bayesian techniques, tax revenues, transfers, and government spending
(all as shares of GDP) have different trends. Therefore, we deal with those
trends, including the linear trend in the model specification.
13See Figure E1 in the Online appendix.
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Results
We estimate two VAR models according to Equations (2) and (3) in order to
obtain the empirical Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). According to the
Schwarz information criterion, the number of lags is set to two. Diagnostic
tests indicate the absence of serial correlation in the residuals by a Lagrange
Multiplier test. We do not reject the hypothesis of normality of residuals
with Jarque-Bera statistics and check the stability condition of the VAR,
finding that all eigenvalues lie comfortably inside the unit circle.
Figure 2 shows the effects of civilian spending on the endogenous vari-
ables in Equation (2). In order to derive the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the impulse response distribution in the graphs, error bands are computed
by Monte Carlo simulations assuming normality in the parameter distribu-
tion. Accordingly, we construct t-tests based on 10,000 different responses
generated by simulations and check whether the point estimates of the mean
impulse responses are statistically different from zero. The responses of the
five variables are expressed by multiplying the estimated parameters of the
VAR by the sample average share of civilian spending in GDP.
We note that civilian spending (graph a) increases significantly and does
not display a large persistence. In contrast to military spending shock, the
pattern of persistence decreases with a half-life of about two years.
The response of the budget deficit variable (graph b) indicates a contrast-
ing pattern: although it starts positively, it decreases and remains signifi-
cantly negative, suggesting that unexpected civilian expenditure is financed
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by an increase in the taxation rate. We observe a positive response for dis-
posable income (graph c) for the time-length considered. This result is in
line with the prediction of the new Keynesian models, where the low per-
sistence of civilian spending shock along with constraints in asset market
participation reduces the wealth effect on Ricardian households.
As predicted by the new Keynesian models, real wage (graphs d) shows
a positive and persistent response to a unitary shock of civilian spending.
Most interestingly, the effect of a civilian expenditure shock on consumption
is shown to be significant for a large timespan, persistently above zero (graph
e). As we can observe, the response of consumption follows that of disposable
income.
Figure 2 in here
Figure 3 displays the IRFs obtained from the VAR expressed in Equation
(3) as a response to a positive shock in military spending. Defense expendi-
ture response (graph a) rises significantly, showing a higher persistence with
respect to the civilian shock. From the patterns of IRFs, we estimate that
half-life period is above eight years. Graph b) pertains to the estimated re-
sponse of the budget deficit variable, reproducing the evidence that, in the
US, the defense sector is largely financed by budget deficits. The response
of disposable income is negative (graph c); this effect is driven by the high
persistence of military spending shock that strengthens the wealth effect on
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Ricardian households. The point estimates shown in the IRFs indicate that
the real wage decreases in response to the military spending shock (graph
d). Interestingly, as found in the neoclassical literature, the pattern of con-
sumption also decreases its impact (graph e), and the point estimates reveal
that the shock may produce a significant effect. The consumption follows
the pattern of the real disposable income response.
Figure 3 in here
Following the recent literature investigating the stimulative effects of fis-
cal actions (Drautzburg & Uhlig, 2015; Leeper, Traum & Walker, 2015; Can-
zoneri et al., 2016), we test the estimated impact multipliers on consumption.
In particular, the impact multiplier on consumption measures the change in
the level of consumption k periods ahead in response to a change in the fiscal
variable of interest given by ∆Ft at time t
14:
Impact multiplier k periods ahead =
(
∆Ct+k
∆Ft
)
(4)
thus the civilian spending impact multiplier is given by ∆Ct+k
∆NMt
and the mil-
itary spending the impact multiplier is given by ∆Ct+k
∆Mt
. Table I shows the
14For example, the civilian spending multiplier is computed as follows, ∆Ct+k∆NMt =
%∆Ct+k
%∆NMt
C
NM , where C and NM are the steady state values of consumption and civil-
ian expenditure, respectively. In particular, C and NM are obtained as the average
values the real non-military expenditure and the real private consumption over the period
1960:Q1−2013:Q4, respectively.
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results for the estimated impact multipliers on consumption. Particularly
interesting for our study is the fact that positive multipliers on consumption
of civilian expenditure, for the 1st, the 4th, the 8th and the 12th quarter,
are 0.19, 0.56, 0.82 and 0.89, respectively. On the contrary (as expected
from the point estimates), consumption multipliers are negative for military
expenditure for the same quarters, between −0.10, −0.19, −0.23 and −0.26,
respectively. Confidence intervals of these government expenditures at 95%
also indicate a statistical significance of separate consumption multipliers,
emphasizing important differences in the IRFs responses of military and civil-
ian expenditures shocks on private consumption. As a robustness check, we
also computed the civilian and military impact multipliers on output.15
Overall, our findings related to civilian spending are in line with the
results by Ricco & Ellahie (2012). In particular, we provide evidence that
increases in the non-military component positively influence the US GDP.
Moreover, we confirm the predictions of two papers that have analyzed the
impact of military spending on the macroeconomy. First, as in Nincic &
Cusack (1979), we find that private consumption falls in response to military
spending increases. Second, as in Barker, Dunne & Smith (1991), we show
the negative impact of defense expenditure on both consumption and GDP.
Table I in here
15Since in this paper we focus on the effects on private consumption, we report these
results in the Online appendix.
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Pre- and post-Great Moderation: Subsample estimates
In this section, we compare the different impacts of civilian and military
spending for two subsamples in order to check the robustness of our empirical
analysis. Our sample choice reflects the well-established hypothesis of a struc-
tural break in the early 1980s (see, among others, Smets & Wouters, 2007;
Bilbiie, Meier & Muller, 2008). In particular, we assume that the first sample
period, the so-called “Great Inflation”, ends in 1979:Q2, namely, the begin-
ning of the Volcker chairmanship.16 The second subsample starts in 1983:Q1
and corresponds to the more recent period of the “Great Moderation” in
which inflation was relatively low and stable. This sample split captures the
general changes in the US business cycle dynamics. Therefore, we estimate
our civilian and military VARs for the two samples: 1960:Q1−1979:Q2 (S1)
and 1983:Q1−2013:Q4 (S2). In the Online appendix, Figures E.2 and E.3
show the estimated IRFs for both the subsamples that we obtained applying
the same technique as above.
Firstly, we observe that the persistence of the civilian shock is higher in
S2 than in S1. Moreover, government budget deficit falls following this shock
in both the subsamples. This pattern confirms that, historically, civilian
expenditure has been financed through increases in taxation. Disposable
income and real wage responses are significantly positive in S1 but not in S2.
Interestingly, we find an evident “crowding-in” effect on private consumption
16With the term “Great Inflation” we refer to the period that lasted nearly two decades
in which there were four economic recessions, two severe energy shortages, and the un-
precedented peacetime implementation of wage and price controls.
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in S1, whereas the response is not significant in S2. Accordingly, these results
confirm that the differences in the persistence of the civilian shock in S1 and
S2 crucially influence the response of private consumption.
Turning to the effects of military spending, we find that the military
shock is more persistent in S2 than S1. Moreover, the responses of the US
macroeconomic aggregates are negligible and not significant in the pre-1980
sample. On the contrary, the responses of S2 are mostly significant for an
extended period. An increase in military spending induces a rise in the
government budget deficit. This result confirms the estimated finding of the
overall sample, namely, military spending is financed through the increase
of budget deficit. Both disposable income and real wage show a negative
response to an increase in military expenditure. As a consequence, private
consumption falls after the shock.
Finally, we computed the consumption multipliers for both subsamples
(Table II). In general, we find that the transmission mechanisms for the
different shocks of fiscal components have changed over time. With regard to
civilian spending, the stronger persistence of the shock in S2 with respect to
S1 implies that the estimated multipliers are systematically higher in the pre-
1980 sample. Turning to military expenditure, the lower persistence of the
shock in the “Great Inflation” period induces slightly positive consumption
multipliers for all the quarters considered.17
17In the Online appendix, we show that the results for the estimated multipliers on
output mimic those of consumption.
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Table II in here
Theoretical model and calibration
Our theoretical framework is fully consistent with the empirical strategy
of the previous section. Indeed, we adopt a solution of our DSGE model,
which implies that the several variables are expressed as their respective log
deviations from the model steady state. Therefore, an unanticipated shock
to civilian (or military) spending causes the temporary change of any given
variable of our model before returning to its steady state. Accordingly, this
interpretation of civilian and military shocks fits consistently with the results
of the impulse response analysis of our estimated structural VARs. In what
follows, we briefly describe the key features of our model, which follows the
framework of Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007).18 In particular, the model
consists of an economy in which households are divided into Ricardians and
non-Ricardians.
As regards labor market structure, it is assumed that there is an economy-
wide union setting wages in a centralized manner. Hence, hours worked are
not chosen optimally by households, but are determined by firms, given the
wage set by the union. The economy produces a single final good and a con-
tinuum of intermediate goods. The aggregate production function includes
18The Online appendix gives a more detailed description of the model and its log-
linearized conditions.
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both capital and labor inputs. The total factor productivity is assumed to
follow a first-order autoregressive process. The final goods sector is perfectly
competitive and is consumed by households.
There is monopolistic competition in the markets for intermediate goods,
each of which is produced by a single firm. Moreover, we assume that in-
termediate goods producer faces restrictions in the price setting process, as
in Calvo (1983). The model encompasses a monetary authority that sets
its policy instrument, the nominal interest rate, according to a generalized
Taylor (1993) rule.
Turning to the fiscal sector, we assume that the government finances its
public spending by issuing bonds and raising lump-sum taxes. Moreover,
government purchases are separated into civilian and military components.
Accordingly, we assume a fiscal policy rule that includes two different public
spending components.19 Civilian and military expenditures evolve exoge-
nously, following to two distinct first-order autoregressive processes. Indeed,
we assume that the resources destined for civilian and military sectors are
AR(1) processes in line with the dynamic responses of our VAR-based esti-
mates.20
Finally, the goods market clearing condition requires that the final goods
19In particular, our fiscal policy rule is an extension of those commonly used in the
literature (see, for example, Bohn, 1998; Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles, 2007)
20Following Smets & Wouters (2007), in a previous version of this paper we included
the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the government spending processes in order to
account for the misspecification of the DSGE common trend. The results obtained in the
two different versions are almost unchanged.
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market is in equilibrium if production equals demand by total household
consumption, aggregate private investment and total government spending.
We propose a model calibration with quarterly data starting from “stan-
dard” parameters extracted from new Keynesian literature. Table III sum-
marizes their values and sources.
Table III in here
In what follows, we focus only on the parameters describing the fiscal sec-
tor which are estimated from our sample. In particular, the values of the re-
sponses of taxes to civilian (φnm) and military (φm) expenditures are obtained
as the difference of the estimated effects of the VAR in civilian/military ex-
penditures and the budget deficit. In line with the findings in the literature,
the estimates for our sample are of φnm=0.16 and φm=0.18.
We also estimate the persistence parameters of civilian and military ex-
penditures, ρnm and ρm, according to the procedure proposed by Marques
(2005), in which the absence of mean reversion of a given series is measured
by using the following statistic:
ρ = 1− n
t
(5)
where n denotes for the number of times the series crosses the mean during
a time interval with t observations. Monte Carlo simulations have shown
the validity and consistency of this estimator in order to obtain this measure
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of persistence. Our VAR-based estimates indicate the lower persistence of
civilian spending shock, whereas the higher persistence appears in the esti-
mated patterns of military expenditure. By using the persistent estimator in
Equation (5), after detrending the time-series of the fiscal components, we
obtain n = 40 for civilian and n = 15 for military spending, such as we have
ρnm = 0.81 and ρm = 0.93, respectively, for t = 216.
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Finally, we calibrate the parameter φb such that it is consistent with the
necessary and sufficient condition for non-explosive deficit dynamics. Thus,
we set φb equal to 0.1. In this regard, the value of the parameter indicating
the response of taxes to budget deficit has been estimated by a large number
of empirical works (see, among others, Bilbiie, Meier & Muller, 2008; Leeper,
Plante & Traum, 2010). In our specific case, since our fiscal rule is very
similar to that adopted by Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007), we chose a
value that lies in the range of estimates provided by these authors.
Impulse response analysis of the simulated model
In this section, we present the impulse response analysis for the theoretical
model described above. Our objective is to compare simulated IRFs with
those obtained from the SVAR. We present the key figures of our analysis
in detail in a supplementary online appendix and summarize those results
21These estimates are obtained from the same series used in the empirical section, i.e.
NMt and Mt are expressed as relative shares of GDP. Moreover, we detrend these series
with the HP filter (smoothing parameter equal to 1,600).
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below.
Implications for the model with heterogeneous fiscal
policy shocks
We first discuss the implications of the model in the case of a positive civil-
ian spending shock. In the Online appendix, Figure E.4 shows that the
persistence of this shock is very low. Interestingly, this result confirms our
empirical findings. In particular, the low persistence of civilian spending
shock reduces the negative wealth effect on Ricardian agents. These perceive
that the increase in the tax burden in present value terms is only temporary,
and they do not significantly change their consumption level.
In addition, one year after the shock, the budget deficit becomes negative
and remains persistently below zero for all the horizons considered. Thus,
the reduction of the budget deficit moves further resources to consumption
of Ricardian agents.
Real wages increase after the shock to civilian spending. This result
can be explained by the substantial rise of labor demand, since the civilian
spending shock causes an increase in the aggregate demand. Due to sticky
prices, not all firms can adjust their prices after the shock. Firms that can-
not change their prices are forced to change their production quantity. Thus,
in order to increase their output, firms raise their demand for labor and
the new equilibrium in the labor market implies a higher real wage. As a
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consequence, the disposable incomes of both non-Ricardians and Ricardians
increases. Accordingly, we observe the so called “crowding-in” effect on to-
tal consumption spending. The higher disposable income of non-Ricardians
induces a substantial increase in their consumption level, which leads to the
rise of private consumption expenditure.
Turning to the effects of a rise in military spending, from Figure E.5 in the
Online appendix, we note a high level of persistence of military expenditure
in line with our estimated results. As a consequence, the negative wealth
effect on Ricardian households is substantial. Indeed, these agents decide to
postpone their consumption because they perceive that the increase in the
tax burden will last for a long period.
The budget deficit expands after the shock. This result is in accordance
with the idea that policy-makers in periods of uncertainty, such as wars or
threat episodes, react for the conflict challenges and their uncertainty by
developing preferences to postpone taxation to future generations. However,
the increase of budget deficit further reduces the incentive of consumption
in the Ricardian households that end up holding all the bonds issued by
government.
The increase in military spending causes a reduction of real wage. This
effect is mainly due to a positive shift of labor supply. Non-Ricardians choose
to increase their hours worked because of the rise in the tax burden. Similarly,
Ricardian households increase their labor supply for a given wage. The new
equilibrium in the labor market implies a lower real wage. Therefore, we
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observe that the military spending shock reduces the disposable income of
non-Ricardian and Ricardian households, inducing the “crowding-out” effect
on consumption.
Robustness
In line with recent new Keynesian models, our theoretical framework in-
cludes several features that allow us to analyze several transmission channels
through which civilian and military shocks affect private consumption. First,
we focus on the implications of the different persistence of each fiscal shock.
Second, we assess the importance of distinct financing mechanisms of pub-
lic spending. Third, we study the impact of different fiscal shocks in the
presence of price rigidities and heterogeneous households (Ricardians and
non-Ricardians). Finally, we analyze the impact of different monetary policy
approaches in response to distinct government shocks.
Different persistence of shocks and financing mechanisms
We begin by describing the behavior of private consumption in response to
different persistence values of civilian spending shocks.22 The “crowding-
in” effect clearly emerges in the benchmark case (ρnm = 0.81), while if we
increase the value of ρnm to 0.93, we observe a small decrease in private
consumption expenditure. Accordingly, when we fix ρnm equal to 0.99 we
obtain a large “crowding-out” effect on consumption.
22See Figure E.6 in the Online appendix.
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Focusing on military spending, we consider the following exercise. We
start by fixing ρm equal to 0.93. We then decrease it to 0.81 and, finally, we
reset it to 0.99. Private consumption responds negatively in the presence of
high shock persistence, whereas it increases when ρm is low.
A crucial aspect of our impulse response analysis is also related to the
different financing mechanisms of civilian and military spending. As we ex-
plained before, in our benchmark calibration, we consider the responses of
taxes to civilian (φnm) and military (φm) expenditures equal to 0.16 and
0.18, respectively. As regards the response of taxes to budget deficit (φb),
we assume it equal to 0.1. In the following exercise, we change the values of
the parameters φnm and φm, keeping fixed the parameterization for φb. As
we show in Figure E.7 in the Online appendix, our objective is to assess the
different reactions of total private consumption to these changes.
We start by analyzing the case of a positive shock to civilian expenditure.
We assume three different values for φnm, that are 0.01, 0.16 (benchmark
case) and 0.99. The “crowding-in” effect on private consumption remains
unchanged in all three cases. However, the magnitude of the rise in total
consumption expenditure changes substantially. Interestingly, when the re-
sponse of taxes to civilian spending is particularly high, the increase of private
consumption is modest compared with the case of a low φnm. In order to
explain the last result, we need to take into account for the negative wealth
effect on Ricardian households caused by the increase of the tax burden. The
high response of taxes to a rise in civilian spending generates a substantial
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wealth effect on Ricardian agents, postponing their current consumption. On
the contrary, if φnm is low, the increase in tax burden is small and Ricar-
dian households do not significantly change their level of consumption. As a
consequence, the “crowding-in” effect is larger.
Turning to the military spending shock, the “crowding-out” reduces if
the value of φm increases. A low value of φm implies a sharp increase of
the budget deficit in response to the military spending shock. This siphons
further resources away from potential consumption of Ricardian households
because they end up holding all the government bonds. On the contrary, with
an high value of φm, the increase of budget deficit is less accentuated. The
latter, in turn, reduces the “crowding-out” effect on private consumption.
Heterogeneous households, price rigidities and monetary policy
Although the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households is
crucial for our setup, it is not the only difference between our framework and
standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models assessing the effects of govern-
ment shocks on private consumption. Indeed, price rigidities and monetary
policy play an important role in the response of private consumption to fis-
cal shocks. In what follows, we provide several robustness checks in order
to clarify these aspects. In order to save space we show the IRFs related to
these sensitivity analyses in the Online appendix (Figures E.8−E.10).
We begin by analyzing the dynamic responses of private consumption to
positive civilian and military spending shocks under our baseline calibration
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and with different parameterizations of λ. The main results of our analysis
do not change if we assume a lower value of λ equal to 0.3. The last result
confirms that our model is able to predict the “crowding-in” effect without
the presence of a substantial share of non-Ricardian consumers. On the
contrary, under the standard assumption of RBC models (accounting only
for Ricardian households), our model generates a negative response of private
consumption to the increase in civilian spending. Evidently, this is in sharp
contrast with the empirical evidence we have shown above.
Focusing on price rigidities and assuming lower values of the Calvo price
probability (0 and 0.3, respectively), we find that private consumption falls
in response to a rise in civilian expenditure. In the case of military spending,
moving from our new Keynesian benchmark toward models with neoclas-
sical characteristics, we find that the negative response of consumption is
strengthened. Interestingly, the magnitude of the negative impact is in ac-
cordance with the findings in the defense economics literature using partial
equilibrium specification.23
Monetary policy is also a relevant transmission channel of government
spending shocks on private consumption. In particular, we assume the case
in which all the model parameters have the same values as in Table III except
for the policy rate response to inflation (φpi) that varies from 1.5 (benchmark
case) to 5 and 10. A high value of (φpi) implies a more aggressive mon-
etary policy. In the presence of an aggressive monetary policy, the effect
23See, for example, Pieroni (2009).
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of an increase in civilian spending on private consumption is negative. In
this case, Ricardian households increase their labor supply as a consequence
of the intertemporal substitution effect. This occurs when a rise in infla-
tion triggers an increase in the real interest rate, thus providing incentives
for Ricardians to postpone consumption. On the contrary, a less aggres-
sive monetary policy (low value of φpi) implies a lower real interest rate and
thereby weakens Ricardians incentives to postpone consumption. Finally, as
expected, higher values (φpi) strengthen the “crowding-out” effect in the case
of military spending shocks.
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effects of US fiscal policy shocks on private consump-
tion over the period 1960:Q1−2013:Q4. The contribution of our analysis is
that we distinguished between civilian and military spending shocks. Our em-
pirical approach allowed us to assess several transmission channels through
which these different government components affect the US economy. In this
regard, we found that civilian spending shocks are less persistent than mil-
itary ones. Moreover, our VAR estimates provided evidence that military
expenditure is usually financed through increases in government deficit. As
a consequence, our impulse response analysis showed that civilian spending
shocks have a largely positive effect on private consumption. On the con-
trary, a negative impact was found between military spending shocks and
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consumption responses. We also assessed the effects of civilian and military
shocks on the US economy for two subsamples corresponding to the “Great
Inflation” and the “Great Moderation” periods, respectively. Our results
indicated that the transmission channels of civilian and military spending
shocks have changed over time. In particular, the persistence of civilian
shocks is larger in the post-1980 period implying less significant effects on
the several macroeconomic aggregates. On the contrary, the negative effects
of military spending shocks are stronger in the “Great Moderation” period.
As a second step of our analysis, we adopted a new Keynesian DSGE
model in order to replicate our empirical findings. In this regard, focusing
on increases in military spending, we were able to simulate the negative con-
sumption response of the VAR estimates reproducing the same main trans-
mission channels. First, the high persistence of this expenditure increases the
negative income effect on Ricardian households. Thus, these agents reduce
drastically their consumption implying the “crowding-out” effect. Second, a
positive response of the budget deficit, through which military spending is
generally financed, leads to a further reduction in the consumption of Ricar-
dian agents that prefer to hold government bonds. Our model also predicts
that the lower persistence of civilian expenditure from its own shocks reduces
the negative wealth effect associated to Ricardian agents. When this effect is
associated with a strong rise in the real wage, we observe a positive response
of aggregate consumption. Indeed, a high real wage stimulates the consump-
tion of non-Ricardians that dominates the fall in consumption of Ricardian
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households.
Although we believe that this analysis is a useful contribution to more ef-
fective management of fiscal policy tools on the expenditure side, it does leave
several interesting questions open for future research. In particular, issues in
estimating the DSGE model parameters have received increasing interest in
the macroeconometric literature. Accordingly, a theoretical framework that
includes Bayesian estimation provides promising opportunities for future re-
search.
Replication data
All material necessary for reproducing the analysis, along with the Online
appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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Table I. Estimated fiscal policy effects (civilian and military spending) on
consumption
Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.19 0.56 0.82 0.89
[0.16/0.22] [0.52/0.59] [0.77/0.88] [0.84/0.94]
Military spending -0.10 -0.19 -0.23 -0.26
[-0.08/-0.12] [-0.16/-0.21] [-0.20/-0.27] [-0.22/-0.29]
Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals are listed in brackets.
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Table II. Subsample estimates, fiscal policy effects (civilian and military
spending) on consumption
S1: Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.97 1.71 1.83 1.38
[0.92/1.03] [1.62/1.79] [1.75/1.91] [1.31/1.45]
Military spending 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.06
[0.12/0.17] [0.09/0.18] [0.07/0.18] [0.00/0.12]
S2: Estimated fiscal policy multipliers on private consumption
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending -0.23 0.02 0.35 0.59
[-0.20/-0.25] [-0.03/0.06] [0.21/0.49] [0.52/0.65]
Military spending -0.27 -0.63 -0.98 -1.24
[-0.23/-0.30] [-0.58/-0.67] [-0.92/-1.03] [-1.17/-1.30]
Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals are listed in brackets.
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Table III. Calibrated parameters of the model
Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount factor β 0.99 Steady state real interest rate: 0.04
El. of inv. wrt capital stock value η 1 King & Watson (1996)
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025 Annual depreciation on capital: 0.10
Fraction of non-Ricardians λ 0.5 Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007)
Capital share in the prod. fun. α 1/3 Labor share: 70%
El. of wages wrt hours worked ϕ 0.2 Rotemberg & Woodford (1999)
Price mark-up parameter µp 0.2 Gali, Lopez-Salido & Valles (2007)
Calvo price probability θ 0.65 Average price duration: 4 quarters
Policy rate response to inflation φpi 1.5 Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2000)
Response of taxes to civilian spending φnm 0.16 Estimates from our data sample
Response of taxes to military spending φm 0.18 Estimates from our data sample
Response of taxes to budget deficit φb 0.1 Calibrated
Persistence of civilian spending ρnm 0.81 Estimates from our sample
Persistence of military spending ρm 0.93 Estimates from our sample
Calibration of the parameters based on quarterly data.
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Figure 1. Financing mechanisms in the US for military conflicts and episodes
Government budget deficit and tax revenues as percentages of GDP are taken from OECD Economic
Outlook, No. 90. In particular, government budget deficit is obtained as the difference between total
disbursements and total receipts of general government.
42
Figure 2. Response of the VAR model to a civilian spending shock
Estimated impulse responses to a civilian spending shock in SVAR. Sample period 1960:Q1−2013:Q4.
Vertical axis indicates deviations from unshocked path. Horizontal axis: quarters after shock.
Confidence intervals at the usual 95% significant level based on 10,000 Monte Carlo replications.
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Figure 3. Response of the VAR model to a military spending shock
Estimated impulse responses to a military spending shock in SVAR. Sample period 1960:Q1−2013:Q4.
Vertical axis indicates deviations from unshocked path. Horizontal axis: quarters after shock.
Confidence intervals at the usual 95% significant level based on 10,000 Monte Carlo replications.
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